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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

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HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

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Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~per~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~per~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement and maintenance of foreign and domestic assets in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~for the procurement and maintenance of foreign and domestic assets~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements ~~from NSA~~ became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, ~~in direct touch with NSA on personnel requirements~~, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 ~~through the Chief of the~~ ~~the Chief of Station, Washington~~, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half ~~he~~ was contacted ~~in~~ ~~to~~ sporadically ~~by the~~ ~~in~~ ~~behalf of the~~ Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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Q Jwin annual salary : 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees &
engaged in Zorifle activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
\$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (~~English~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (~~British, American, Russian, etc.~~) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, ^{with high regard for operational security} assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kurbak only (e.g., what does ~~the agency~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kurbak, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially denied?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannel ^{re trips}

d. No PA's ^(except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govt.

f. No use of ^{JUN 24 1975} ~~any~~ agent who ever worked for a ^{IA} U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would ~~be needed~~.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

~~Marshall~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kurbakers who can

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i. Pretext: Witchambers reveal; this established by Rosen
 j. No discussion in stations. k. No "game" until
 ready to go if it all
 4. Blackmail:

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freed to travel

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Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems.

~~Not to be used~~ case.

- Legal not secure enough.
- 1) Maximum security + within Harbor only (e.g., how much does ~~the~~ know?). Limitation on number ~~of~~.
 - 2) One focal point for research, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandate. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-station) commo.
 - 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Officer) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. ^{JUN 24 1975} CIA _{is 4 above essential.}

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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10) ~~Exercises~~ recommended. ~~Exercises will be done~~

~~Notes~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (as archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ^{all} ~~any~~ Cuban personnel involved should have some C.E. experience.

14) ~~Stability~~ + stable in ~~person~~


15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~select~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

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ed 1 - 25/1 - 4 sec. station
 "The Magic Button"
 Narcotics Büro ~~✗~~ 

8

"for a living" - RIS 201. cover
 button - Bankruptcy - no star
 eyes - Jim A. / Contradict
 not a TSD problem from U-2

Apply brakes

Last report beyond last report &
 a confession of weakness. -

- El Benefactor - assumptions -

Example 3 "wrong"

Framework of ~~_____~~ job. ~~_____~~

Memo. 

~~_____~~ Year

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Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~_____~~ Foreign DCI - Matter -

no file Review - ~~_____~~

1. Select proper open to run -

2. ~~_____~~

May 2

3. Security Rules

B-WITH-AS-3

4. ~~_____~~ lives

~~_____~~ - Review.

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6. No [REDACTED]
 7. No project or papers
except per cones.
 8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -
[REDACTED] Project Dept LCH -
[REDACTED] 1500 - from MB -
mark spot again. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
project - [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 9. Disposed -
 10. Targets who & where -
Must know before
we can spot -
 11. Case officering
 12. [REDACTED]
 13. [REDACTED]
- Fd I list - Remember

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